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Abstract. Availability analysis is used to assess the possible failures
and their restoration process for a given system. This analysis involves
the calculation of instantaneous and steady-state availabilities of the in-
dividual system components and the usage of this information along with
the commonly used availability modeling techniques, such as Availability
Block Diagrams (ABD) and Fault Trees (FTs) to determine the system-
level availability. Traditionally, availability analyses are conducted us-
ing paper-and-pencil methods and simulation tools but they cannot as-
certain absolute correctness due to their inaccuracy limitations. As a
complementary approach, we propose to use the higher-order-logic the-
orem prover HOL4 to conduct the availability analysis of safety-critical
systems. For this purpose, we present a higher-order-logic formalization
of instantaneous and steady-state availability, ABD configurations and
generic unavailability FT gates. For illustration purposes, these formal-
izations are utilized to conduct formal availability analysis of a satellite
solar array, which is used as the main source of power for the Dong Fang
Hong-3 (DFH-3) satellite.
Keywords: Higher-order Logic, Unavailability Fault Tree, Availability
Block Diagram, Theorem Proving.
1 Introduction
Availability analysis is used to identify and assess the causes and frequencies
of system failures. The outcomes of availability analysis play a vital role in
ensuring failure-free operation of the given system. Due to the rapid increase
in the usage of technological systems in safety and mission-critical domains,
such as transportation and healthcare, the demand of their availability and thus
availability analysis is also growing dramatically.
The first step, in the availability analysis, is the evaluation of basic metrics of
reliability and maintainability, such as mean-time to failure (MTTF) [1], mean-
time between failure (MTBF) [1] and mean-time to repair (MTTR) [1], at the
individual component level of the given system. These metrics are then used to
calculate the availability of each component of the system by using the reliability
? The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com
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and the maintainability distributions, such as Exponential or Weibull, with fail-
ure and repair rates, λ = 1MTTF and µ =
1
MTTR . The next step is the selection
of an appropriate availability modeling technique, such as Availability Block Di-
agrams (ABD) [2] and unavailability Fault Trees (FT) [2]. These techniques are
the extension of traditionally used reliability modeling techniques, such as Relia-
bility Block Diagram (RBD) [1] and Fault Tree (FT) [1], for availability analysis
purposes. Besides these two techniques, Markov chains [3] have also been used
for availability assessment. In practice, it provides much more detailed analy-
sis compared to ABD and UFT. However, the major problem with the Markov
chain based availability analysis is its exponential growth in the state-space as
the system complexity increases [3]. For instance, consider the large Multistage
Interconnection Networks (MINs) [3] that are mainly used in the supercomputers
and multi-process systems to realize communication among thousands of pro-
cessors. To conduct the Markov chain based availability analysis of a 8 x 8 MIN
consisting of 16 switching elements, we need to consider 216 possible states [3].
Although, we can somewhat reduce the number of states by taking appropriate
assumptions but it can compromise the accuracy of the availability results [3].
On the other hand, ABD and UFT are intuitive and transparent methods that
can be used to describe the availability of large and complex systems, like MINs
[4]. The ABD and UFT based modeling techniques also allow us to estimate
the availability of the given system at the system level and play a particularly
useful role at the design stages of the system to scrutinize the design alternatives
without building the actual system. Once an appropriate availability model is
obtained then the next step is to perform the system level availability analysis
of the model using an appropriate analysis technique.
Traditionally, simulation tools, such as ReliaSoft [5] and ASENT [6], are used
to analyze the availability models. However, these techniques cannot be termed
as accurate due to their inherent incompleteness and the involvement of pseudo-
random numbers and numerical methods. Given the safety and financial-critical
nature of many technological systems these days, a slight unavailability of such
a system, at a particular instant, may lead to disastrous situations, including
the loss of human lives or heavy financial setbacks. For instance, it is reported
that the Amazon Web Service (AWS) suffered an unavailability for 12 hours, in
April 21, 2011, causing hundreds of high-profile Web sites to go offline [7], which
resulted in a loss of 66,240 US$ per minute downtime of its services.
Model checking techniques have been used to overcome the above-mentioned
limitations for conducting the reliability analysis (e.g.,[8,9]), which is in turn used
to assess the failure free operation of a system in a given interval and is thus
quite closely related to availability analysis. Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) have
also been utilized to formalize RBD and FT, which are then used to analyze the
availability [10]. However, a major disadvantage of using these approaches is their
inability to analyze large size systems. Moreover, the computation of probabili-
ties in these methods [8,9] involves numerical methods, which compromises the
accuracy of the results. Leveraging upon the high expressiveness of higher-order
logic and a recent formalization of probability theory [11], the higher-order-logic
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theorem prover HOL4 has been recently used for the formalization of Reliability
Block Diagrams (RBD) [12,13] and Fault trees (FT) [14]. These efforts clearly
indicate the effectiveness of using a higher-order-logic (HOL) theorem prover for
conducting reliability and failure analysis and, in the current paper, we develop
the reasoning support for availability analysis by extending the HOL4 formal-
izations of RBD and FT. It is important to note that our proposed approach of
using HOL theorem proving for availability analysis is primarily based on deduc-
tive reasoning. The availability properties are verified by using sound reasoning
process and it is supported by the fact that every new theorem is derived from
already verified theorems [15]. Therefore, the analysis is much more rigorous and
accurate compared to computer algebra systems (CAS), such as Mathematica
[16], which simplify the given closed form expressions and returns the results in
the form of symbolic expressions. This fact can be illustrate with this example
that the simplification of the expression (x
2−1)
(x−1) by CAS yields (x + 1 ) without
explicitly mentioning (x 6= 1 ) [17]. On the other hand, HOL theorem prover
cannot verify the same expression without this premise.
The main contribution of the paper is to formalize the ABD, unavailability
FT gates and steady-state availability to develop a formal library of availabil-
ity theory foundations. This library can then be used to model and analyze
both component and system level availability properties of any system within
the sound core of a theorem prover. The main challenge faced in this formal-
ization, compared to our earlier formalizations related to reliability theory, was
to introduce the notion of an availability event that is associated with each sys-
tem component. Each one of these availability events consists of a sequence of
multiple random variables that are functioning over time. In order to illustrate
the effectiveness of our proposed formalization, we present a formal availability
analysis of a satellite solar array [18,19] that has been used as a main power
source for the Dong Fang Hong-3 (DFH-3) satellite. In addition, we also provide
some automated reasoning support for the availability analysis. This automa-
tion allows us to quantitatively compute the availability and unavailability of
the DFH-3 satellite solar array from the given values of the failure and repair
rates.
2 Probability and Reliability in HOL
Mathematically, a measure space is defined as a triple (Ω,Σ, µ), where Ω is a
set, called the sample space, Σ represents a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, where
the subsets are usually referred to as measurable sets, and µ is a measure with
domain Σ. A probability space is a measure space (Ω,Σ, Pr), such that the
measure, referred to as the probability and denoted by Pr, of the sample space
is 1. In the HOL formalization of probability theory [11], given a probability
space p, the functions space, subsets and prob return the corresponding Ω, Σ
and Pr, respectively. This formalization also includes the formal verification of
some of the most widely used probability axioms, which play a pivotal role in
formal reasoning about reliability properties. A random variable is a measurable
function between a probability space and a measurable space. The measurable
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functions belong to a special class of functions, which preserves the property that
the inverse image of each measurable set is also measurable. A measurable space
refers to a pair (S,A), where S denotes a set and A represents a nonempty
collection of sub-sets of S. Now, if S is a set with finite elements, then the
corresponding random variable is termed as a discrete random variable otherwise
it is called a continuous one.
Now, reliability R(t) is defined as the probability of a system or component
performing its desired task over certain interval of time and expressed mathe-
matically in terms of random variable as R(t) = Pr(X > t). This concept can
be formalized in HOL4 as follows:
` ∀ p X t. Reliability p X t = distribution p X {y | Normal t < y}
where the variables p : (α → bool)#((α → bool) → bool)#((α → bool) → real),
X : (α→ extreal) and t : real represent a probability space, a random variable
and a real number respectively. The function Normal takes a real number as its
inputs and converts it to its corresponding value in the extended − real data-
type, i.e, it is the real data-type with the inclusion of positive and negative
infinity. The function distribution takes three parameters: a probability space
p, a random variable X and a set of extended − real numbers and outputs the
probability of a random variable X that acquires all the values of the given set
in probability space p.
3 Instantaneous and Steady-state Availabilities
The instantaneous or point availability Ainst(t) of a system or component can
be defined as the probability that the given system or component is properly
functioning at a given time instant t. If there are no repairs required after the
fault has occurred then the availability A(t) is simply equal to the reliability
R(t) of the system. However, if the system or component requires repair, then
the availability can be considered as the function of two random variables, i.e.,
Xi = Ti+Di, where Ti is the working time in the i
th period and Di is the repair
time in the ith period. If the time when a system starts working in the kth period
is Sk =
∑k−1
i=1 Xi then the considered system is said to be available at time t
when there exists a period such that Sk ≤ t < Sk + Tk. Now, the corresponding
availability event constituted by these random variables can be formalized in
HOL4 as follows:
Definition 1: ` ∀ p X t. avail event p L n t =
{x | SIGMA (λa. FST (EL a L) x + SND (EL a L) x) (count n) ≤ t ∧
t < SIGMA (λa. FST (EL a L) x + SND (EL a L) x) (count n) +
FST (EL n L) x} ∩ p space p
The above definition takes a probability space p, a list of random variable pairs
L, representing the working and repair time random variables, a number n and
a time variable t and returns the corresponding availability event. The function
SIGMA takes an arbitrary function f and a set s and returns the sum of all the
values obtained by applying the function f on each element of the given set.
The HOL4 function count takes a number n and returns a set containing all the
natural numbers less than the given number n. Similarly, the function EL takes
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an index variable and a list and retrieves the list element located at the given
index number. The HOL4 functions FST and SND are primarily used to access the
first and second elements in a pair. Definition 1 models the corresponding event
of the ith working interval only. To cover all the working intervals, we take the
union of these availability events, corresponding to the pairs of random variable
in list L, in HOL4 as follows:
Definition 2: ` ∀ p L t. union avail events p L t =
BIGUNION (IMAGE (λa. avail event p L a t) (count (LENGTH L)))
An interesting property of the availability event is that its probability, also
known as instantaneous availability, is always greater or equal to the correspond-
ing reliability, i.e., RT1(t) ≤ Ainst(t), where T1 is the first time-to-work random
variable. This property can be formally verified, based on Definitions 1 and 2,
in HOL4 as follows:
Theorem 1: ` ∀ p t L. prob space p ∧ (0 ≤ t) ∧ ¬NULL L ∧
(∀n. avail event p L n t ∈ events p) ∧
(∀a b. (a 6= b) ⇒
DISJOINT (avail event p L a t) (avail event p L b t)) ⇒
(Reliability p (FST (HD L)) t ≤ prob p (union avail events p L t))
The first two assumptions ensure that p is a valid probability space and time
index t must be positive. The next two assumptions make sure that the given
list of random variables must not be empty and the availability events are in
the events space p. The last assumption ensures that the availability events are
disjoint. The conclusion models the property that the instantaneous availabil-
ity is always greater or equal to reliability. The function Reliability takes a
probability space p, a random variable that is associated with the system or
component and a time variable t and returns the reliability of the system or
component [12].
Consider that the failure and repair random variables are exhibiting expo-
nential distributions with failure and repair rates λ and µ, respectively, then the
instantaneous availability at the component level can be expressed mathemati-
cally as follows [1]:
Ainst(t) =
µ
µ+ λ
+
λ
µ+ λ
e−(λ+µ)t (1)
where the failure and repair rates are the mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and
mean-time-to-repair (MTTR), i.e. λ = 1MTTF and µ =
1
MTTR , which are basic
metrics for reliability and maintainability, respectively.
Now, we can formalize the instantaneous availability, given in Equation 1, as
follows:
Definition 3: ` ∀ p L m. inst avail exp p L m =
∀t. prob p (union avail events p L (&t)) =
SND m
(SND m + FST m)
+
FST m
(SND m + FST m)
* exp (-(SND m + FST m) * &t)
where the variables FST m and SND m represent failure and repair rates, respec-
tively.
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The steady-state availability of any component, which reflects the long-term
availability after the system becomes stable, can be evaluated by taking the limit
as t approaches infinity in Equation (1).
Asteady = lim
t→∞
Ainst(t) =
µ
µ+ λ
(2)
The above equation can be formally verified in HOL4 as follows:
Theorem 2: ` ∀ p L m. prob space p ∧ (0 < FST m ∧ 0 < SND m) ∧
(∀t. (∀a b. a 6= b ⇒
DISJOINT (avail event p L a t) (avail event p L b t)) ∧
(∀n. avail event p L n t ∈ events p)) ∧ inst avail exp p L m ⇒
(lim (λt. prob p (union avail events p L (&t))) =
SND m
(SND m + FST m))
The assumptions of the above theorem are quite similar to those used in Theorem
1. The proof of Theorem 2 is primarily based on the fact that the negative
exponential function tends to zero as its exponent tends to infinity.
4 Availability Block Diagrams
Availability Block Diagram (ABD) are graphical structures that represent the
system components and their interconnections in the form of blocks and connec-
tor lines, respectively. The system is termed as available, if at least one path of
properly available components from the input to output exists.
The availability of a system with components connected in series is considered
to be available at time instant t only if all of its components are available at
time t, as depicted in Figure 1(a). If Ainsti(t) is a mutually independent event
that represents the instantaneous availability of the ith component of a serially
connected system with N components at time instant t, then the steady-state
availability of the complete system can be expressed as [20]:
lim
t→∞
Pr(
N⋂
i=1
Ainsti(t)) =
N∏
i=1
(
µi
µi + λi
) (3)
The series ABD configuration can be formalized as:
Definition 4: ` (∀ p. series struct p [] = p space p) ∧
(∀ p h t. series struct p (h::t) = h ∩ series struct p t)
The above function takes a list of events corresponding to the availability of
individual components of the given system and the probability space p and
returns the intersection of all of the elements in a given list and the whole
probability space, if the given list is empty. Based on this definition, Equation
(3) can be formally verified as follows:
Theorem 3: ` ∀ p L M. (A1): prob space p ∧ (A2): (0 ≤ t) ∧
(A3): (∀z. MEM z M ⇒ 0 < FST z ∧ 0 < SND z) ∧
(A4): (LENGTH L = LENGTH M) ∧
(A5): (∀t’. ¬NULL (union avail event list p L (&t’)) ∧
(A6): (∀z. MEM z (union avail event list p L (&t’)) ⇒ z ∈ events p) ∧
(A7): mutual indep p (union avail event list p L (&t’))) ∧
(A8): inst avail exp list p L M ⇒
Formal Availability Analysis using Theorem Proving 7
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1: ABDs (a) Series (b) Parallel (c) Series-Parallel (d) Parallel-Series
(lim (λt. prob p (series struct p (union avail event list p L (&t)))) =
list prod (steady state avail list M))
where the function union avail event list can be obtained by mapping the
function union avail event on every element of the given random variable list.
The function list prod returns the product of given real number list. The first
two assumptions (A1-A2) ensure that p is a valid probability space and the
time t must be positive. The assumptions (A3-A4) guarantee that the failure
and repair rates are positive and the length of failure-repair random variable
and the corresponding rate lists are equal. The next two assumptions (A5-A6)
make sure that the length of availability event list, representing the availabil-
ity of individual components, must not be empty and each availability event
in a avail event list is in events space p. The last two assumptions (A7-
A8) provide the mutual independence among all the availability events and the
instantaneous availability of each component. The conclusion of the theorem rep-
resents Equation (3) as the function steady state avail list takes a list of
pairs, representing the failure and repair rates, and returns a list of steady-state
availabilities, corresponding to each component of the given system.
Similarly, the availability of a system with parallel connected components,
depicted in Figure 1(b), mainly depends on the component with the maximum
availability. In other words, the system will continue functioning as long as at
least one of its components remains functional. Mathematically [20]:
lim
t→∞
Pr(
N⋃
i=1
Ainsti(t)) = 1−
N∏
i=1
(1− µi
µi + λi
) (4)
Now, the availability of a system with a parallel structure is defined as:
Definition 5: ` (parallel struct [] = {}) ∧
(∀ h t. parallel struct (h::t) = h ∪ parallel struct t)
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The function parallel struct accepts a list of reliability events and returns
the parallel structure reliability event by recursively performing the union op-
eration on the given list of reliability events or an empty set if the given list is
empty. We can now verify Equation (4) as follows:
Theorem 4: ` ∀p L M.
(lim (λt. prob p (parallel struct p (union avail event list p L (&t)))) =
1 - list prod (one minus list (steady state avail list M))
The above theorem is verified under the same assumptions as Theorem 3. The
conclusion of the theorem represents Equation (4) where, the function one minus
list accepts a list of real numbers [x1, x2, · · · , xn] and returns the list of real
numbers such that each element of this list is 1 minus the corresponding element
of the given list, i.e., [1−x1, 1−x2 · · · , 1−xn]. The proof of Theorem 4 is based
on Theorem 3 along with the fact that given a list of n mutually independent
events, the complement of these n events are also mutually independent.
If in each serial stage the components are connected in parallel, as shown
in Figure 1(c), then the configuration is termed as a series-parallel structure. If
Ainstij (t) is the event corresponding to the instantaneous availability of the j
th
component connected in an ith subsystem at time instant t, then the steady-state
availability of the complete system can be expressed as follows [20]:
lim
t→∞
Pr(
N⋂
i=1
M⋃
j=1
Ainstij (t)) =
N∏
i=1
(1−
M∏
j=1
(1− µij
µij + λij
)) (5)
By extending the ABD formalization approach, presented in Theorems 3 and
4, we formally verify the generic availability expression for series-parallel ABD
configuration, given in Equation (5), in HOL4 as follows:
Theorem 5: ` ∀ p L M. prob space p ∧ (LENGTH L = LENGTH M) ∧
(∀z. MEM z (FLAT M) ⇒ 0 < FST z ∧ 0 < SND z) ∧
(∀n. n < LENGTH L ⇒ (LENGTH (EL n L) = LENGTH (EL n M))) ∧
(∀t’. (∀z. MEM z (list union avail event list p L (&t’)) ⇒ ¬NULL z) ∧
(∀z’. MEM z’ (FLAT (list union avail event list p L (&t’))) ⇒
z’ ∈ events p) ∧
mutual indep p (FLAT (list union avail event list p L (&t’)))) ∧
two dim inst avail exp p L M ⇒
(lim (λt. prob p
(series parallel struct p (list union avail event list p L (&t)))) =
list prod (one minus list (MAP (λa. compl steady state avail a) M)))
where the function list union avail event list is obtained by mapping the
function union avail event list on each element of the given random variable
list.
The function series parallel struct models the series-parallel ABD by
first mapping the function parallel struct on each element of the given event
list and then applying the function series struct to this obtained list. Simi-
larly, the function compl steady state avail returns a list of one minus steady-
state availabilities.
The functions list prod and one minus list are used to model the product
and complement of steady-state availabilities, respectively. The assumptions are
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similar to the ones used in Theorems 3 and 4 with the extension that the given
lists are two-dimensional lists. The HOL4 function FLAT is used to convert a two
dimensional list into a single list. The conclusion models the right-hand-side of
Equation (5). The proof of the above theorem uses Theorems 3 and 4 and also
requires a lemma that given the list of mutually independent reliability events,
an event corresponding to the series-parallel structure and a reliability event are
also independent in probability.
If the components in these reserved subsystems are connected serially then the
structure is called a parallel-series structure, as depicted in Figure 1(d). If Aij(t)
is the event corresponding to the availability of the jth component connected in
a ith subsystem at time t, then the steady-state availability becomes:
lim
t→∞
Pr(
M⋃
i=1
N⋂
j=1
Aij(t)) = 1−
M∏
i=1
(1−
N∏
j=1
µij
µij + λij
) (6)
The above equation is also verified as a HOL4 theorem in our development and
more details about it can be found in [21].
5 Unavailability Fault Trees
Unavailability FT is a graphical technique consisting of internal nodes, which are
represented by gates like OR, AND and XOR, and the external nodes, that model
the unavailability events, which are associated with the occurrence of faults in
components of the given system. The generic nature of these gates allows us to
construct an efficient and accurate unavailability fault tree (FT) model for any
given system. This FT can in turn be used to investigate the potential causes of
a fault occurrence, which makes the system unavailable, and the calculation of
minimal number of unavailability events, known as minimal cut-set (MCS), that
contribute towards the occurrence of a top event, i.e., a critical event, which can
cause the whole system unavailable upon its occurrence.
We can formalize the unavailability event of a system by taking the comple-
ment of the availability event with respect to the probability space p.
Definition 6: `∀ p X t.
union unavail events p L t = p space p DIFF union avail events p L t
The instantaneous unavailability of the system can be expressed as follows:
Ainst(t) =
λ
µ+ λ
− λ
µ+ λ
e−(λ+µ)t (7)
The HOL4 formalization of the above equation is as follows:
Definition 7: ` ∀ p L m. inst unavail exp p L m =
∀t. prob p (union unavail events p L (&t)) =
FST m
(SND m + FST m)
-
FST m
(SND m + FST m)
* exp (-(SND m + FST m) * &t)
If the occurrence of the unavailability event at the output is caused by the
occurrence of all the input unavailability events then this kind of behavior can
be modeled by using the AND unavailability FT gate, as shown in Table 1.
Pr(
N⋂
i=2
Ainsti(t)) =
N∏
i=2
λi
λi + µi
(8)
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Table 1: HOL Formalization of Fault Tree Gates
Unavail.
FT Gates HOL Formalization
` ∀ p L t. AND unavail FT gate p L t =
inter list p (union unavail event list p L t)
` ∀ p L t. OR unavail FT gate p L t =
union list (union unavail event list p L t)
NAND
1
n
k ` ∀p L1 L2 t. NAND unavail FT gate p L1 L2 t =
inter list p (compl list p (union unavail event list p L1 t)) ∩
inter list p (union unavail event list p L2 t)
` ∀ p L t. NOR unavail FT gate p L t =
p space p DIFF union list (union unavail event list p L t)
` ∀ p A B. XOR FT unavail gate p A B =
((p space p DIFF A ∩ B) ∪ (A ∩ p space p DIFF B))
` ∀ p A. NOT unavail FT gate p A = (p space p DIFF A)
The above equation can be formalized in HOL4 as follows:
Theorem 6: ` ∀ p L M. prob space p ∧
(∀z. MEM z M ⇒ 0 < FST z ∧ 0 < SND z) ∧ (LENGTH L = LENGTH M) ∧
(∀t’. ¬NULL (union unavail event list p L (&t’)) ∧
(∀z. MEM z (union unavail event list p L (&t’)) ⇒ z ∈ events p) ∧
mutual indep p (union unavail event list p L (&t’))) ∧
inst unavail exp list p L M ⇒
(lim (λt.
prob p (AND unavail FT gate p (union avail event list p L (&t)))) =
list prod (steady state unavail list M))
The assumptions of the above theorem are similar to the ones used in Theorem
2 and the conclusion of Theorem 5 represents Equation (8).
In the OR unavailability FT gate, the occurrence of the output unavailability
event depends upon the occurrence of any one of its input unavailability event.
The function OR unavail FT gate, given in Table 1, models this behavior as it
returns the union of the input unavailability list L by using the recursive function
union list. The NOR unavailability FT gate, modeled by using the function
NOR unavail FT gate, given in Table 1, can be viewed as the complement of the
OR unavailability FT gate and its output unavailability event occurs if none of
the input unavailability event occurs.
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Similarly, the NAND unavailability FT gate, represented by the function
NAND unavail FT gate in Table 1, models the behavior of the occurrence of an
output unavailability event when at least one of the unavailability events at its
input does not occur. This type of gate is used in unavailability FTs when the
non-occurrence of the unavailability event in conjunction with the other unavail-
ability events causes the top unavailability event to occur. This behavior can be
expressed as the intersection of complementary and normal events, where the
complementary events model the non-occurring unavailability events and the
normal events model the occurring unavailability events. The output unavail-
ability event occurs in the 2-input XOR unavailability FT gate if only one, and
not both, of its input unavailability events occur. The HOL4 representation of
the behaviour of the XOR unavail FT gate is also presented in Table 1. The
function NOT unavail FT gate accepts an unavailability event A and probabil-
ity space p and returns the complement to the probability space p of the given
input unavailability event A. The verification of the corresponding unavailabil-
ity expressions, of the above-mentioned unavailability FT gates, is presented in
Table 2. These expressions are verified under the same assumptions as the ones
used for Theorem 6 and the proofs are mainly based on some fundamental mu-
tual independence properties of the given unavailability events along with some
axioms of probability theory.
The principle of inclusion exclusion (PIE) forms an integral part of the rea-
soning involved in verifying the unavailability of a FT. In FT based unavailability
analysis, firstly all the basic unavailability events are identified that can cause
the occurrence of the system top unavailability event. These unavailability events
are then combined to model the overall fault behavior of the given system by us-
ing the fault gates. These combinations of basic unavailability events, called cut
sets, are then reduced to minimal cut sets (MCS) by using set-theory rules, such
as idempotent, associative and commutative. The PIE is then used to evaluate
the overall failure probability of the given system.
If Ai represent the i
th basic unavailability event or a combination of unavail-
ability events then the overall unavailability of the given system can be expressed
in terms of the probabilistic inclusion-exclusion principle as follows:
P(
n⋃
i=1
Ai) =
∑
J 6={},J⊆{1,2,...,n}
(−1)|J|−1P(
⋂
j∈J
Aj) (9)
The above equation has been formalized in HOL4 as follows [14]:
Theorem 7: ` ∀ p L t. prob space p ∧
(∀ x. MEM x (union avail event list p L t) ⇒ x ∈ events p) ⇒
(prob p (union list (union avail event list p L t)) =
sum set {y | y ⊆ set (union avail event list p L t) ∧ y 6= {}}
(λt. -1 pow (CARD y - 1) * prob p (BIGINTER y)))
The function sum set recursively sums the return value of the function f , which
is applied on each element of the given set s. In the above theorem, the set s is
represented by the term {x|C(x)} that contains all the values of x, which satisfy
condition C. Whereas, the λ abstraction function (λt. -1 pow (CARD t - 1)
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Table 2: Unavailability Fault Tree Gates
Unavailability FT Gates Conclusions of the formally verified Theorems
lim
t→∞
AOR(t) = lim
t→∞
Pr(
N⋃
i=1
Ainsti(t))
= 1−
N∏
i=2
(1− λi
λi + µi
)
lim (λt. prob p
(OR unavail FT gate p L &t) =
1 - list prod (one minus list
(steady state unavail list M)))
lim
t→∞
ANOR(t) = 1− lim
t→∞
AOR(t)
=
N∏
i=2
(1− λi
λi + µi
)
(lim (λt. prob p
(NOR unavail FT gate p L &t)) =
list prod (one minus list
(steady state unavail list M
lim
t→∞
ANAND(t) =
lim
t→∞
Pr(
k⋂
i=2
Ai(t) ∩
N⋂
j=k
Ai(t)) =
k∏
i=2
(1− µi
µi + λi
) ∗
N∏
j=k
λi
µi + λi
(lim (λt. prob p
(NAND unavail FT gate p L1 L2 t) =
list prod (steady state avail M1) *
list prod (steady state unavail list M2
lim
t→∞
AXOR(t) =
lim
t→∞
Pr(A¯(t)B(t) ∪A(t)B¯(t)) =
(1− λ1
λ1 + µ1
) ∗ λ2
λ2 + µ2
+
λ1
λ1 + µ1
∗
(1− λ2
λ2 + µ2
)
(lim (λt. prob p
(XOR unavail FT gate p A B &t)) =
(1 - (steady state unavail M1))∗
(steady state unavail M2) +
(steady state unavail M1)∗
(1 - (steady state unavail M2))
lim
t→∞
ANOT (t) = Pr(A(t)) = (1− λ
λ+ µ
) lim (λt. prob p (NOT FT gate p A &t) =
FST m / (FST m + SND m)
* prob p (BIGINTER t)) models (−1)|J|−1P(⋂j∈J Aj), such that the functions
CARD and BIGINTER return the number of elements and the intersection of all
the elements of the given set, respectively.
The proof script [21] of the above-mentioned formalizations of ABD and
unavailability FT gates and the PIE principle is composed of more than 9000
lines of HOL script and took about 350 man-hours. The main outcome of this
formalization is that the definitions and theorems of ABDs and FT gates can be
used to capture the behavior of wide variety of real-world systems and analyze
their corresponding availability in higher-order logic.
6 Application: Satellite Solar Arrays
As an illustrative application to demonstrate the effectiveness of our availability
theory related formalization, we consider a solar array that has been used in
the DFH-3 Satellite, which was launched by the People’s Republic of China
on May 12, 1997 [18,19]. Solar arrays are one of the most vital components of
the satellites because the mission success heavily depends upon the continuous
reliable source of power. The satellite’s solar array is a mechanical system, which
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mainly consists of various mechanisms, including: deployable, synchronization,
locking and orientation.
The solar array can be modeled by using series-parallel ABD configurations,
shown in Figure 2, and based on the availability of its individual components,
such as electric detonator (ED), the cutting knife (CK), the starting spring (SS),
hing bearing (HB) and hing of locking mechanism (HL), the overall availability
of the solar array can be evaluated [18]. The HOL4 formalization of the solar
array ABD (Figure 2) is as follows:
the electric 
detonator 
(ED)
the electric 
detonator 
(ED)
the cutting 
knife (CK)
the starting 
spring (SS)
the starting 
spring (SS)
the hing 
bearing 
(HB)
the hing 
bearing 
(HB)
the hing of 
locking 
mechanism (HL)
the hing of 
locking 
mechanism (HL)
Fig. 2: Solar Array ABD
Definition 8: ` ∀p X ED X CK X SS X HB X HL t.
RO ABD p X ED X CK X SS X HB X HL t =
series parallel struct p
(list union avail event list
([[X ED;X ED];[X CK];[X SS;X SS];[X HB];[X HB];[X HL;X HL]]) t)
We verified the following theorem for the availability of the satellite solar array:
Theorem 8 : ` ∀p X ED X CK X SS X HB X HL.
(lim (λt. prob p ( RO ABD p X ED X CK X SS X HB X HL &t)) =
(1 - (1 - steady state avail ED) pow 2) * steady state avail CK *
(1 - (1 - steady state avail SS) pow 2) *
((steady state avail HB) pow 2) * (1 - (1 - steady state avail HL) pow 2)
We have omitted the assumptions of this theorem here due to space limitations
and the complete formalization is available at [21]. The proof of the above the-
orem is primarily based on Theorem 5 and is very straightforward.
An unavailability FT can be constructed by considering the faults in the solar
array mechanical components, which are the fundamental causes of satellite’
solar array mechanisms failure. The unavailability FT for the solar array of
the DFH-3 Satellite that was launched by the People’s Republic of China on
May 12, 1997 [19] is depicted in Figure 3 and we formally analyze this FT
in this paper. The proposed FT formalization (functions OR unavail FT gate
and AND unavail FT gate, given in Table 1) is used to model the MCS of the
unavailability of the solar array as follows:
Definition 9: ` ∀ p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t.
Solar unavail FT p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 t =
OR unavail FT gate
[OR unavail FT gate (union avail event list p [x1; x2; x3; x4] t);
AND unavail FT gate p (union avail event list p [x5; x6] t);
OR unavail FT gate
(union avail event list p [x7; x8; x9; x10; x11; x12; x13; x14] t)]
The overall unavailability of a solar array can now be verified as follows:
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Fig. 3: Solar Array Unavailability FT
Theorem 9: ` ∀ p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14.
(lim(λt.
Solar unavail FT p x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 &t)) =
1 - (list prod (steady state unavail list [x5;x6]) *
(1 - list prod (one minus list (steady state unavail list
[c1;c2;c3;c4;c6;c7;c8;c9;c10;c11;c12;c13;c14]))))
Again all quantifiers and the assumptions of the above theorem have not been
included due to space limitations and the complete theorem can be found at
[21]. The proof of the above theorem utilizes the PIE principle (Theorem 7) and
the unavailability FT gates with their corresponding mathematical expression,
given in Tables 1 and 2.
The proof script [21] for Theorems 8 and 9 is composed of about 100 lines
of HOL code compared to about 9000 lines of code that had to be written to
formalize the foundational availability concepts. This straightforward reasoning
clearly indicates the usefulness of our work. The distinguishing features of the
formally verified Theorems 8 and 9, compared to the other existing availability
analysis alternatives, include their generic nature, i.e., all the variables are uni-
versally quantified and thus can be specialized to obtain the availability for any
given failure and repair rates, and their guaranteed correctness due to the in-
volvement of a sound theorem prover in their verifications. Moreover, the usage
of a theorem prover in their verification ensures that all the required assump-
tions for the validity of the results are explicitly included in the theorems, which
is quite important for designing accurate systems.
In order to facilitate the use of our formally verified results by industrial
design engineers for their availability analysis, we have also developed a set
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of SML scripts to automate the simplification step of these theorems for any
given failure and repair rate values corresponding to the DFH-3 satellite solar
array components. For instance, the auto solar RBD avail script automatically
computes the availability up to 12 decimal places based on Theorem 8 as follows:
` prob space p ∧
(∀t’. (∀z. MEM z (FLAT (list union avail event list
[[X ED;X ED];[X CK];[X SS;X SS];[X HB];[X HB];[X HL;X HL]] (&t’))) ⇒
z ∈ events p) ∧
mutual indep p (FLAT
(list union avail event list
[[X ED;X ED];[X CK];[X SS;X SS];[X HB];[X HB];[X HL;X HL]] (&t’)))) ∧
two dim inst avail exp p
[[X ED;X ED];[X CK];[X SS;X SS];[X HB];[X HB];[X HL;X HL]]
[[(0.1,0.3);(0.1,0.3)];[(0.2,0.5)]; [(0.3,0.4); (0.3,0.4)]; [(0.7,0.8)];
[(0.7,0.8)]; [(0.5,0.5); (0.5,0.5)]] ⇒
lim (λt. prob p ( RO ABD p X ED X CK X SS X HB X HL &t)) = 0.116618075802
This auto solar RBD avail script can be used for any values of the failure
and repair rates and can be easily extended to be used for the instantiation
of the generic result of Theorems 9 [21]. With a very little modification, these
kind of automation scripts can facilitate industrial design engineers to accurate
determine the availability of many other safety-critical systems.
7 Conclusion
The foremost requirements to conduct the formal availability analysis within a
theorem prover is to formalize the ABD configurations, i.e., series, parallel, series-
parallel and parallel-series, unavailability FT gates, such as AND, OR, NAND,
NOR, XOR and NOT, and instantaneous and steady-state availability. This
paper fulfills the above-mentioned requirement and thus provides a framework,
which can be used to carry out the formal availability analysis of any system
within a sound core of HOL4 theorem prover. For illustration, our formalizations
are utilized to conduct the formal availability analysis of an satellite solar array
and the results have been found to more rigorous than the existing availability
analysis alternatives. However, this formalization is only limited to static ABD
and UFT models and cannot express the time varying system states, dependent
systems and non-series-parallel topologies. This limitation can be removed by
extending the present formalization to dynamic ABD and dynamic UFT. This
can be done by combining this formalization of ABD and UFT with the recently
proposed Markov chain formalization [22] in HOL4.
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